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Abstract 
In this article we examine the legitimacy of committee standardization as an alter-
native to pure market processes of technical standardization of information and 
communication technology (ICT). We argue that not only mandatory (regulative) 
but also voluntary (coordinative) standards require some kind of democratic le-
gitimacy. While the question of how to achieve this legitimacy has become central 
to today's changing world of standards, this situation is not adequately reflected in 
how the mounting legitimacy-deficit is treated. We note here that there remains a 
tendency to think of the legitimacy-deficit primarily in terms of "input legitimacy" 
criteria. At the same time we observe a tendency for standardization organizations 
(SDO) to orient efforts towards achieving "output legitimacy" by developing stan-
dards that are regarded by diverse groups of (legitimizing) stakeholders as consti-
tuting "good standards". This article therefore applies the distinction between input 
and output legitimacy to the rapidly evolving standardization landscape, arguing 
that it is necessary to expand the analysis of the legitimacy-deficit in the formal 
bodies responsible for ICT standards. We address what democratic legitimacy 
means in terms of standards and standardization, discuss why it is particularly 
important here, and explore how it has been addressed. Current examples indicate 
that in order to arrive at "good" standards SDO extend and redefine the cognitive 
and normative frame of standardization. This frame change helps to include non-
technical and non-commercial interests and values without directly involving the 
growing variety of stakeholders and civil society advocates in the process.  
                                                       
1 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 7th Conference of the European Socio-
logical Association (Torun, Poland, Sept. 9-12, 2005) in the session "Science, Technology 
and the Public" of the Research Network Sociology of Science and Technology (SSTNET) and 
at the Stockholm Centre for Organizational Research (SCORE) Conference "Organizing the 
World" (Stockholm, Sweden, Oct. 13-15, 2005). We would like to thank two anonymous 
reviewers for their helpful comments. 
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1 Introduction 
Legitimacy of standards and the stan-
dardization process has become abso-
lutely central to today's changing 
world of standards. Yet there remains 
a tendency to think of the legitimacy-
deficit in standards primarily in terms 
of "input legitimacy" criteria, especially 
in terms of representation of different 
stakeholders during the standardiza-
tion process. This focus on input 
legitimacy alone however inevitably 
falls short of the expectations of the 
theory of democratic representation 
which it attempts to live up to. Legiti-
macy based on this form of 
representation is extremely difficult if 
not impossible to accomplish in 
standardization. This has increasingly 
been recognized by the stan-
dardization organizations (SDO) which 
have started to work around the 
limitations of the engrained focus on 
input legitimacy alone. 
A starting point for the article is thus 
the observable trend for SDO to re-
orient their quest for increased legiti-
macy around efforts to achieve "output 
legitimacy" by developing standards 
that are regarded by diverse groups of 
(legitimizing) stakeholders as consti-
tuting "good standards". Here we 
observe that SDO increasingly attempt 
to provide for the consideration of 
interests and values of groups such as 
environmentalists, consumers or 
employees. Recently civil society 
groups have tried to establish more 
general public policy interests as the 
basis for deliberation in some SDO. 
This reinforces efforts of the SDO to 
avoid overloaded processes that at-
tempt to directly involve too many 
stakeholders and advocates but to 
draw attention to their interests and 
values through modifying the cognitive 
and normative frame in which stan-
dard setting takes place. 
In this light the article applies the 
distinction between input and output 
legitimacy to the evolving standardiza-
tion landscape on the premise that 
effectively addressing the legitimacy-
deficit requires coordinating both 
input and output based legitimacy 
approaches that are appropriate to 
different standards settings. We par-
ticularly address the area of voluntary 
ICT standards because these directly 
affect core aspects of the network 
society. We discuss whether different 
types of standards involve different 
legitimacy requirements, distinguish 
between input and output legitimacy, 
and look at the cognitive and norma-
tive frame of the committee delibera-
tions in order to more precisely ana-
lyze the strategies of the standardiza-
tion organizations to meet the legiti-
macy requirements. Some illustrations 
of more recent output-oriented meas-
ures are also presented. 
 
2 Standards and legitimacy 
2.1  Focus on ICT standards 
Standards are acknowledged to be 
building-blocks for the information 
society. What these blocks are, how 
and why they come about, and what 
they achieve are matters the literature 
has, somewhat curiously, found diffi-
cult to provide uniform answers. The 
heterogeneity of concepts and defini-
tions of standards and standardization 
testifies to the heterogeneity of the 
phenomenon. But it also reflects the 
fact that standards and the standardi-
zation landscape in which they are set 
continue to undergo profound change 
as a function of the brisk dynamics of 
the industry and changing power 
relations. 
To a large extent the dynamics of the 
ICT industry are responsible for this 
change in institutional, organizational 
and process aspects of standardiza-
tion. These are reflected in: 
• The formal setting in which the 
process takes place (on markets, 
among firms, by committees). 
• the rationale that initiated the 
process (e.g. to establish technical 
compatibility, to promote competi-
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tive advantage, to minimize nega-
tive externalities), 
• the mechanisms employed to 
involve the relevant stakeholders 
and allow them to help shape the 
standard (membership conditions,  
intellectual property rights, regula-
tory requirements, etc.), 
• as well as characteristics of the 
outcome (public-good, private good 
content) and the forces that shape 
the expectancy to adopt or other-
wise comply with the output. 
How a standard comes into being and 
according to which mode it diffuses 
are crucial dimensions which affect the 
democratic legitimacy of the standard. 
This applies to all kinds of standards – 
product and process standards, meas-
urement standards but also newer 
types of management standards. They 
all carry a cognitive or normative 
expectation to comply. Despite many 
commonalities there are also crucial 
differences between standards groups. 
The argument here focuses on the 
legitimacy of committee standardiza-
tion as an alternative to pure market 
standards processes. Our attention is 
concentrated on standards in ICT since 
this technological area brings together 
a pronounced reliance on standards 
on the one hand, with a central socie-
tal importance as the core of the 
network society on the other. Informa-
tion and communication technology 
accelerates the diffusion of inter-
organisational networks and intensi-
fies communication and collaboration 
between organizations and individuals 
(Castells 2001). ICT facilitates e-
business and e-government if stan-
dards are available and complied with. 
They ensure the compatibility of com-
ponents and the accuracy of technical 
operations and they guide the use of 
the systems. The standards impinge on 
the benefit and risk which the utiliza-
tion of technology entails for users and 
third parties as well. It has been ar-
gued that standards might even have 
an effect on the "democratic quality" of 
ICT (cf. Iversen et al. 2004). 
2.2 Important distinctions in the 
world of standards  
Concerning the legitimacy of standards 
it is important to distinguish between 
standards set on markets and those 
that involve formal standardization 
procedures. In the first case, individual 
commercial interests can manage to 
promulgate ICT solutions on the 
market where they become de-facto 
standards. The market is the ultimate 
selection environment for technologies 
and this is the default situation for the 
diffusion of standards incorporated in 
the technology. The diffusion of de-
facto standards is based on market 
leadership or on bandwagon and 
imitation processes, in which the 
number of actors attracted by a stan-
dard increases with the number of 
those who have already adopted the 
standard. 
Other standards are developed and 
agreed on in committees. Such com-
mittees, generally called standards 
developing organizations (SDO), are 
dedicated to the joint elaboration of 
standards. The SDO differ with respect 
to their degree of explicit institution-
alization – some have a more official 
others a more informal character – but 
they share many procedural elements 
and rules of collaborative committee 
standardization. We will focus on 
these in section 3. 
The distinction between market stan-
dards and committee standards arises 
from the circumstances of their emer-
gence. Equally important from the 
perspective of the legitimacy of stan-
dards is the degree to which their 
compliance takes on an obligatory 
nature. Standards differ in this respect. 
Some are regulative others coordina-
tive (Diagram 1).2 Regulative standards 
– often in the form of maximum or 
minimum requirements and limits – 
aim at preventing negative external-
                                                       
2 This distinction serves an analytical 
purpose. Many standards blend coordina-
tive and regulative elements. 
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ities through internalization, i.e. im-
posing the externalities on those who 
have induced them. These standards 
depend on governments or other 
political authorities to become effec-
tive within their area of jurisdiction. 
Thus, regulative standards for, say, 
environmental protection, have the 
normative character of a legal rule or 
an ordinance mandated by hierarchical 
political governance. 
Coordinative standards, such as proto-
col and interface specifications, on the 
other hand, frequently aim at promot-
ing interoperability and compatibility 
of technology in order to reduce trans-
action costs and to generate positive 
externalities. These standards cover 
economic sectors (industries) or mar-
kets for the respective technology, and 
they ignore political frontiers. Coordi-
native standards, say, a specific modu-
lation procedure, emerge in markets or 
result from voluntary agreements. 
They are similar to conventions and 
tend to be self-enforcing, i.e. they 
enjoy a considerable likelihood of 
compliance (Schmidt/Werle 1998: 119, 
120). 
Put in game-theoretic terms, coordina-
tion is often akin to the "battle of the 
sexes". Here actors strive for a com-
mon solution but initially disagree as 
to which particular solution to choose. 
Regulation, on the other hand, shows 
features of a "prisoners' dilemma" 
where incentives to cooperate are so 
weak that, as a rule, no common 
socially beneficial solution is achieved 
voluntarily (Snidal 1985). The latter 
problem can only be overcome in a 
"collaborative regime" which is based 
on enforceable agreements secured by 
hierarchical political governance. 
Coordination in contrast can be 
achieved on a voluntary basis. In this 
case a "coordinative regime" facilitates 
institutionalized self-coordination by 
providing opportunities to communi-
cate and to negotiate a common 
solution (Stein 1990).3 
The two types of standards require 
different levels of democratic legiti-
macy. It is clear that standards that are 
imposed and that thus become manda-
tory need strong democratic backing. 
                                                       
3 This distinction of coordination and 
regulation looks at costs and benefits from 
a rational perspective focusing on interest 
and utility. But regulation, often taking the 
form of legal rules or law, also engages 
normative considerations and touches 
upon social values which are symbolized 
and reinforced by these rules. "Content" 
regulation – for instance, focusing on what 
is communicated or broadcasted via the 
channels of a telecommunications network 
– is usually based on normative as well as 
economic or commercial criteria. 
 
Diagram 1: Two types of standards: An analytical distinction 
 Coordinative Regulative 
Aim Interoperability, 
compatibility 
Prevention of negative external-
ities of technology 
Mode of 
generation 
Negotiation of agreements 
among "interested" actors, 
emergence in markets 
Hierarchical political 
governance 
Normative 
character 
Convention, voluntary Legal rule, mandatory 
Area of 
validity 
Industries, markets  
(techno-economic units) 
States  
(political units) 
Economic 
effects 
Reduction of transaction 
costs, positive externalities 
Internalization of negative 
externalities 
  (Source: Werle 2002: 246) 
Raymund Werle/Eric Iversen, Technical Standardization 23 
 
Actors who benefit from the provision 
and use of a product or service will not 
be inclined to bear costs or other 
burdens which, as a side effect of their 
activities, are incurred by third parties. 
These actors, who may not even be 
aware of the negative externalities, are 
compelled by regulative standards to 
internalize the externalities. Thus, at 
first glance, these standards appear to 
be extremely precarious from the 
perspective of legitimacy. But if they 
are included in legal regulations, they 
derive their legitimacy from the na-
tional governments or the intergov-
ernmental regimes which promulgate 
the standards. Accordingly, legitimacy 
is not so much contingent on how and 
by whom a regulative standard has 
been developed (e.g. by a bureaucracy 
or by an expert committee) but rather 
on the authority of the government or 
intergovernmental organization which 
adopts the standard. 
The situation is different if political 
authorities have de-facto delegated 
regulatory power to an SDO. The "New 
Approach to Technical Harmonization" 
directive of the EU provides a case in 
point. According to this directive, 
European harmonized standards 
which include regulatory elements 
("essential requirements") are devel-
oped by European SDO and de-facto 
binding without further endorsement 
by the political authorities. Similar 
patterns have evolved in national 
standardization. But as European and 
national SDO do not have the legal 
status of independent regulatory 
agencies (Thatcher 2002) political 
authorities must be concerned about 
the legitimacy of the standardization 
process: its openness, transparency, 
and democratic pluralism (Daelemans 
1997; Egan 1998; Tamm Hallström 
2004: 11-15). 
Voluntary (coordinative) standards – 
no matter whether they were devel-
oped by an SDO or emerged in a 
market – seem to be less problematic 
than technical regulations as regards 
the requirement of democratic legiti-
macy. Formally nobody can be com-
pelled to comply with a coordinative 
standard. But this view would be too 
narrow. Some standards may be 
indirectly promulgated by governments 
or courts referencing them in legal 
regulations or judicial decisions. 
Equally important is that particularly 
in network industries such as tele-
communications and information 
technology coordinative standards can 
attain a quasi-mandatory status as a 
consequence of network effects 
(Shapiro/Varian 1999). If a standard 
becomes prevalent in such an industry, 
it may eventually lock in (Hawkins 
1999). That means that producers and 
users of a specific product or service 
may be compelled to conform to the 
prevailing standard even if they have 
implemented a different one and face 
high switching costs. In this way, a 
coordinative standard developed by an 
SDO may require legitimacy compara-
ble to a regulation despite being im-
posed through a market process.4 
 
3 Deliberation in standardization 
organizations 
Technical standards are never purely 
technical but can obscure commercial 
interests, political preferences, moral 
evaluations etc. at the same time that 
these underlying interests and choices 
are brought to bear. This ambiguity is 
again why the democratic legitimacy of 
all standards is at issue as a matter of 
principle. Following the above argu-
ment, legitimacy requirements can be 
said to differ depending on the type of 
standard in question. Regulative 
standards need a strong democratic 
legitimacy which they often derive 
from the political authority mandating 
the standard. The "burden" of achiev-
ing legitimacy rests on those who 
                                                       
4 Tamm Hallström (2004) deals with issues 
closely related to legitimacy of voluntary 
standardization in her analysis of the 
strategies of two SDO to establish author-
ity and achieve compliance with standards. 
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impose the standard and not on the 
standard's source, no matter if it is an 
SDO, a single expert or a government 
department. Only if regulatory author-
ity is delegated to an SDO the organi-
zation has to deal with legitimacy 
requirements directly. 
In the case of coordinative standards 
the legitimacy requirement diverges 
according to their source. If they 
evolve in markets in an uncontrolled 
process of spontaneous adoption by 
producers and users of technology 
nobody can be held responsible for the 
economic and social effects and the 
standards are taken for granted. If a 
dominant firm pushes a standard, this 
company may be blamed morally 
(rather than legally), but it will usually 
not be expected to endow the standard 
with legitimacy. Only if the coordina-
tive standard has been developed by 
an SDO and exerts some pressure of 
compliance the question of legitimacy 
of the standard, respectively the or-
ganization accountable for its devel-
opment, arises. 
Hence, the issue of legitimacy primar-
ily surfaces in committee processes in 
SDO. Technical standardization in a 
SDO is essentially a deliberative proc-
ess. It sets out to address a recognized 
need for collective decision-making. 
Stakeholders may allude to a need for 
improved coordination between differ-
ent parts of the value chain to reduce 
transaction costs, for a modular de-
composition of a technical system to 
provide more choices for the con-
sumer, or for new safety features to 
reduce accidents. Participants in the 
standards committee legitimize their 
preferences in collective interaction 
with other group members. Technical 
issues are always involved in the 
discussions and technical reasoning 
often guides decision-making. But 
from the angle of democratic legiti-
macy of the process and its outcome, 
the plurality of less technical concerns 
– ranging from the commercial to the 
moral – may play an equally important 
role in collective deliberations. A 
standard adopted by a committee 
exerts pressure to comply not only on 
the committee members but also on 
non-participants. In addition to this 
direct effect the standard usually has 
indirect or external effects. The direct 
and indirect effects will only be ac-
cepted or tolerated if the standardiza-
tion process is regarded as legitimate. 
How do SDO cope with the require-
ment of democratic legitimacy? If we 
look at the landscape of SDO we find 
different types of organizations which 
vary according to the geographical 
scope of their jurisdiction, their formal 
status, as well as to other features. 
SDO can be national, regional or 
international in scope and they are 
official or unofficial (informal) organi-
zations. The latter distinction is con-
tinuous rather than discrete. Further-
more, some of the national SDO have a 
regional or global significance. 
The most prominent official interna-
tional SDO (with national membership) 
are the standardization branch of the 
intergovernmental International Tele-
communication Union (ITU-T), the 
international non-governmental Inter-
national Standardization Organization 
(ISO) and its sister body, the Interna-
tional Electrotechnical Commission 
(IEC). Also at the regional level we 
have official SDO such as the Euro-
pean Telecommunications Standards 
Institute (ETSI), the European Commit-
tee for Standardization (CEN) and the 
one for Electrotechnical Standardiza-
tion (CENELEC). The spectrum of 
official organizations is completed by 
national SDO which we find in all 
industrialized countries. Organizations 
such as the British Standards Institu-
tion (BSI), the Deutsches Institut für 
Normung (DIN), or the Association 
Francaise de Normalisation (AFNOR), 
are politically independent and for-
mally non-governmental organiza-
tions, but they are accredited or rec-
ognized by governments. To some 
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extent governmental recognition lends 
legitimacy to an SDO.5 
The majority of SDO are informal. They 
include national or international trade 
associations and professional organi-
zations which, besides other more 
central activities, discuss and occa-
sionally develop standards. The preva-
lence of informal standardization is 
most visibly indicated by the ever 
growing number of private consortia. 
Most of them are vendor-driven and 
many disappear once a particular 
standardization task has been finished. 
Few informal SDO have had such a 
continuous significance as the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF) and the 
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) in 
the area of Internet standardization. 
Participation in the IETF and its nu-
merous working groups is open to 
anyone and a broad and unrestricted 
discussion of proposals via electronic 
mailing lists is possible. W3C is a 
member organization which develops 
basically all standards for the web. 
Members are companies from the 
                                                       
5 Usually SDO are accredited on the condi-
tion that they provide for the representa-
tion of consumer, labour and other inter-
ests. 
industry and service sectors as well as 
research and education institutions. 
The number of SDO is still growing 
and the landscape is steadily changing. 
The headline-trend can be summarized 
as a move from regulative to coordina-
tive standards, from national to re-
gional and international standardiza-
tion and from intergovernmental and 
other official organizations to private 
consortia of standardization.6 The 
proliferation of bodies has led to a 
degree of overlapping standardization 
activities which vie with one another 
for members and for getting their 
standards adopted. This competition 
between standards and standards 
bodies tends to heighten the impor-
tance of legitimacy where it might set 
apart a standard which is perceived to 
cater to a narrow set of proponent 
interests from a competing standard 
which lays claim to serve wider inter-
ests. 
The proliferation trends indicate that 
despite undisputable diversity the SDO 
                                                       
6 Mattli argues that the trend toward 
private consortia, he calls it "private gov-
ernance" of standardization, has revealed 
limits and failings, including a lack of 
legitimacy, which have triggered moves 
toward "joint private-public governance" 
(Mattli 2003: 210). 
Diagram 2: Prevailing institutional rules of standardization organizations 
1. Participation is within certain membership rules open to those being 
substantially interested in the standards. 
2. Usually members are organizations rather than individuals. Individuals 
are regarded as "delegates" of organizations. 
3. The work is committee-based, cooperative and consensus-oriented. It 
follows formalized rules and procedures. 
4. Organization and working procedures are impartial, unsponsored and 
politically independent ("due process"). The organizations are non-profit 
organizations. 
5. The work is based on technological knowledge. It is not remunerated 
(voluntary). 
6. Most standards are non-mandatory and public goods. However, they are 
not necessarily provided to the public free of charge (but on equal 
terms). 
(Source: Werle 2001: 397) 
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show remarkable similarity concerning 
central institutional features (Diagram 
2).7 Apparently new organizations are 
designed according to the model of 
existing ones with respect to these 
features. This process of imitation and 
copying of organizational models, 
designated "mimetic isomorphism" by 
DiMaggio and Powell (1991), includes 
the bylaws and charters of many 
consortia, as well as the internal 
organization of work (Werle 2001). 
The status of the standards which are 
developed by SDO is ambivalent as far 
as their legitimacy is concerned. Firms 
and users may not differentiate ac-
cording to which organization a stan-
dard was adopted by as long as they 
regard a standard as beneficial and in 
this sense as "good". It is when the 
standard leads to detrimental effects 
that the legitimacy of the standard will 
be questioned. In this context the 
standard's origin and the democratic 
quality of the process of its develop-
ment can be decisive. 
Most institutional features included in 
Diagram 2 conform to the principles of 
a democratic decision-making process 
but they do not guarantee that they are 
fulfilled. Openness to participation for 
substantially interested actors (1), for 
instance, implicitly suggests that they 
do have access to standardization. But 
in most SDO work is not remunerated 
(5) and participants incur membership 
fees and travel expenses. Thus, engag-
ing in standardization requires sub-
stantial financial resources and time. 
 
4 Input and output legitimacy 
Current changes of the landscape of 
SDO, mainly driven by the increasing 
                                                       
7 In a recent report it is maintained that in 
particular the larger long-standing consor-
tia resemble the official SDO in many 
respects (NO-REST 2005: 75 ff.). Schoechle 
takes up a more sceptical position 
concerning the institutional similarity of 
official and informal SDO and the implica-
tions for legitimacy (2004: 149-214). 
number of consortia and the promi-
nent role standards play in the chang-
ing regulatory environment, have 
triggered what can be called a com-
petitive "market" for standards. This 
has repercussions for the strategies of 
SDO to achieve legitimacy for their 
products. We introduce the distinction 
between input and output legitimacy 
to address such strategies. 
In the literature we find different 
variants of this distinction. 
• Neo-institutional organization 
theory highlights two basic strate-
gies to achieve legitimacy (Meyer/ 
Rowan 1991). Organizations either 
put emphasis on the input and in-
ternal "production" side demon-
strating the involvement of a variety 
of actors working in accordance 
with impartial and fair procedural 
rules in an open technical dis-
course. Or the organizations focus 
on the "quality" of their products 
(output) designed to the benefit of 
the addressees or the general pub-
lic. 
• A distinction introduced in the 
debates about deliberative democ-
racy points in a similar direction. 
Institutions can involve more "ag-
gregative" or more "deliberative" ar-
rangements. The first are mainly 
based on aggregating interests 
through direct representation in the 
decision making process, while the 
latter put more emphasis on the 
justifications of collective choices 
(Cohen 1998: 186). Here organiza-
tions are required to provide the 
basis for inclusion of a pluralism of 
preferences and values. 
• Institutional political theory most 
explicitly draws on the distinction 
between input and output elements 
in terms of achieving legitimacy 
(Scharpf 1999). It is argued that 
central pillars on which input le-
gitimacy rests are direct participa-
tion of all affected by a rule (stan-
dard) and decision-making based 
on consensus. Output legitimacy, 
on the other hand, is achieved by 
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successfully dealing with problems 
which can only be collectively re-
solved. Among other things, that 
requires all interests to be consid-
ered (but not represented) in the 
definition of the collective interest. 
Thus, what is aimed at from the 
output perspective can be called 
"good" governance8 or, regarding 
standardization, "good" standards. 
Ideally, such standards would be 
beneficial or acceptable to all who 
are affected by them regardless of 
their participation in the rule-
setting process (Diagram 3). 
SDO blend input and output criteria in 
their institutional design and in their 
operations. But particularly official 
SDO have traditionally put more 
emphasis on input legitimacy. A crucial 
principle here is openness. It requires 
that all affected individuals and or-
ganizations have the opportunity to 
get involved in the decision-making 
process. But this appears feasible only 
in a local (maybe national) context. At 
                                                       
8 This concept has gained popularity in 
view of the European Union's "comitology" 
and the adoption of regulations by this 
committee system through a "deliberative" 
process in which "technical" expertise plays 
an important role (Joerges 1999). 
the regional or global level – in inter-
national standardization where most 
committee standards with a global 
significance are adopted – only a 
minority of those interested or affected 
will be able to participate directly.9 The 
question is whether this minority 
represents all those who cannot but, 
from an input perspective, should be 
present in a standardization commit-
tee. 
The official international or regional 
SDO follow the principle of territorial 
representation with national SDO or 
other national representatives being 
their members. The national "delega-
tions" are regarded as the voices and 
representatives of the aggregated and 
streamlined interests of all interested 
actors in the respective country. In 
principle, the international SDO adhere 
to the one-nation, one-vote decision 
rule which assures that every country 
(every national delegation) has a vote. 
If the question of legitimacy is limited 
to the aspect of territorial representa-
tion through national delegations and 
                                                       
9 As indicated earlier, the prohibitive costs 
incurred by those being involved in 
international standardization in effect 
exclude interested parties from 
participating in standardization. 
Diagram 3: Modes of achieving legitimacy in standardization 
Input legitimacy 
Focus on the "production" (standardization process) 
• Openness to and direct representation (participation) of all actors 
interested in or potentially affected by a standard 
• Work in accordance to impartial and fair procedural rules 
• Decision-making based on consensus 
Output legitimacy 
Focus on the "product" (standard) 
• All "interests" are considered (but not directly represented) in the stan-
dardization process 
• External tracking and monitoring of standardization by stakeholder 
and advocacy groups 
• Decision-making in an open inclusive discourse (arguing) to the benefit 
of all standards addressees ("good" standards) 
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if the fiction is upheld that all affected 
interests are covered by these delega-
tions the most significant require-
ments concerning input legitimacy of 
official international SDO are met. At 
the same time the burden assuring the 
involvement of diverse interests is 
shifted to the national organizations.10 
Thus, national SDO have been the first 
to be confronted by the fact that many 
organizations and individuals with a 
legitimate interest in a standard usu-
ally do not participate in standardiza-
tion despite their formal openness. 
Lack of resources, the collective action 
dilemma and other factors account for 
this deficit. This collides with the claim 
of the official SDO to develop stan-
dards which are dedicated to the 
public benefit. Early on many SDO 
tried to mitigate this deficit by involv-
ing different interests. Initially they 
stimulated user participation. But most 
users were big companies from indus-
tries such as media, finance, aerospace 
or defense and not small enterprises or 
consumers. In the 1970s, the SDO 
started efforts to promote the involve-
ment of consumer, labor and later also 
environmental interests in standardi-
zation. Since the early 1990s, consum-
ers have been represented in practi-
cally all national SDO in the industrial-
ized world (Schepel/Falke 2000: 101ff). 
In many countries consumer represen-
tation is directly or indirectly finan-
cially supported by governments and 
also stipulated if the SDO want to be 
officially recognized. Typically special 
                                                       
10 An official "Statement on Consumer 
Participation in Standardization Work" 
issued by ISO/IEC in 2001 illustrates this 
tendency to shift responsibility to the 
national level. ISO/IEC recognizes that "the 
interests of governments, manufacturers, 
all categories of users and consumers, and 
any others concerned, should be taken into 
account" and stipulates that "delegations to 
technical committee meetings should be in 
a position to represent all interests within 
their respective countries." 
<www.iso.org/iso/en/prods-services/ 
otherpubs/pdf/copolcoparticipation_2001-
en.pdf> 
consumer councils or consumer com-
mittees are established which monitor 
consumer relevant standardization 
work, investigate consumer concerns 
and develop standards proposals on 
this basis. That means on the other 
hand that representatives of consumer 
interests usually do not directly par-
ticipate in the deliberations of a stan-
dards committee. 
Compared to consumer interests the 
representation of other non-industry 
interests is less well institutionalized. 
The northern European countries as 
well as Germany and France who to 
some extent share a corporatist tradi-
tion, provide arrangements for the 
involvement of trade unions in stan-
dardization while such arrangements 
are lacking in other countries (Schepel/ 
Falke 2000: 123). Mainly in Germany 
where, in 1975, the Trade Union Fed-
eration (DGB) called for a "democratic" 
process of standards development 
"some major progress" can be ob-
served concerning labor interests 
representation especially if occupa-
tional health and safety issues are at 
stake. But out of some 26,000 experts 
involved in standards committees of 
the German DIN only one tenth of a 
percent represent employees (Bamberg 
2003). Without financial support by the 
German government, representation 
would be even weaker. 
Yet less favorable is the situation at the 
national level to environmental inter-
ests. In a few countries officials from 
environmental offices or ministries 
participate in standardization. In rare 
cases representatives of environmental 
groups are involved in the work of 
technical committees. The German 
DIN set up a coordination office for 
environmental protection. This office, 
funded by the government, examines 
standards at the draft stage 
(Schepel/Falke 2000: 126). 
This illustration indicates that issues 
of territorial representation are irrele-
vant at the national level. Rather a 
kind of functional representation with 
Raymund Werle/Eric Iversen, Technical Standardization 29 
 
an origin in corporatist thinking is 
seen to facilitate achieving legitimacy 
(Voelzkow 1996). The involvement in 
standardization of a variety of non-
industry interests, in the first place 
consumer, to some degree also labour 
interests, has gained importance, 
whereas environmentalists have to 
struggle to create awareness in stan-
dardization. Other interests and per-
spectives play an even weaker role. 
Given these asymmetries at the na-
tional level one cannot expect national 
SDO to provide regional or interna-
tional SDO with unbiased input. But 
these organizations have increasingly 
ceased to rely on national input any-
way. In particular in ICT, the tradi-
tional bottom-up process of feeding 
national standards into supranational 
committees which then negotiate an 
international standard on this basis 
has been undermined by the shift of 
generic standardization to regional 
and international SDO (Büthe/Witte 
2004). At the same time standardiza-
tion has moved towards the early 
stages of technological design (ex-ante 
standardization). At the working level – 
where standards are developed, tested 
and negotiated – the regional and 
international SDO have abolished the 
principle of territorial representation 
and are open to direct membership of 
firms, R&D institutes, business asso-
ciations, government departments and 
other corporate actors. National SDO 
only transpose into national standards 
what has been developed internation-
ally. As a consequence the regional 
and international SDO have to respond 
to legitimacy requirements of the same 
type as the national SDO and they do 
so in the same way emphasizing 
functional representation and open-
ness. But the barriers to including 
non-industry interests are even higher 
at the supranational than at the na-
tional level. 
Again consumers' interests are more 
effectively represented than other non-
industry interests. In Europe where the 
European Commission has tradition-
ally mandated many standards and 
tried to shape the institutional land-
scape of standardization the Commis-
sion contributes to funding the Euro-
pean Association for the Co-ordination 
of Consumer Representation in Stan-
dardization (ANEC) which is based on 
a network of more than 200 consumer 
representatives across Europe. ANEC is 
an associated member of the European 
Committee for Standardization (CEN). 
At the international level the ISO set 
up the Committee on Consumer Policy 
(COPOLCO) in 1978 "to ensure that the 
voice of the consumer is heard in the 
development of standards" by selecting 
areas that are of priority to consumers 
and coordinating participation of 
consumer representatives in the tech-
nical committees developing standards 
in these areas.11 
Labour interests in standardization are 
often represented by trade unions. At 
the European level unions mainly 
focus on health and safety standards 
which are often mandated by the 
European Commission and have the 
character of binding regulations. In 
1989, the European Trade Union 
Confederation (ETUC) set up a Techni-
cal Bureau for Health and Safety 
(TUTB) which became an associated 
member of CEN in 1993.12 
Participation of environmental groups 
in European standardization has a 
rather short history. Early efforts of the 
European Environmental Bureau 
(EEB), a Federation of Environmental 
Citizens Organizations, to get involved 
in standardization failed, partly due to 
a lack of funding by the European 
Commission of a technical bureau 
which was designed to organize direct 
                                                       
11 <www.iso.org/iso/en/comms-markets/ 
consumers/iso+theconsumer-04.html> 
12 In April 2005, the TUTB merged with the 
European Trade Union Institute (ETUI) and 
the European Trade Union College (ETUCO) 
– to become the European Trade Union 
Institute for Research, Education and 
Health and Safety (ETUI-REHS). Now this 
new organization is an associated member 
of CEN. 
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involvement of environmentalists in 
standardization. Instead, the European 
Environmental Citizens Organisations 
for Standardisation (ECOS) were 
awarded an EU contract, starting on 
November 1, 2002, which facilitates 
the coordination of input of environ-
mental organizations into standards 
work. ECOS is a membership organiza-
tion, open to non governmental or-
ganizations (NGO) active at a Euro-
pean or a national level. Assisted by 
the EEB, ECOS sends experts to tech-
nical committees and working groups 
of the European SDO. It is associated 
member of CEN and cooperating 
partner of CENELEC.13 At the interna-
tional level we find, for instance, IEC's 
Advisory Committee on Environmental 
Aspects (ACEA) which was created in 
1994. In a recently published docu-
ment ACEA draws the attention of the 
designers of electrotechnical products 
to the need to integrate environmental 
aspects into the product design. An-
other document concerning the inclu-
sion of environmental aspects into 
product standards explicitly addresses 
the technical committees which de-
velop them.14 
 
5 Toward output legitimacy 
Different formats have been chosen by 
the SDO to facilitate participation of 
consumer, employee, and environ-
mental groups in standardization. In 
some instances, group representatives 
have direct access to the committees 
in which the detailed standardization 
work is done. In other cases special 
committees have been set up in the 
SDO to monitor and track the stan-
dardization work and to provide input 
                                                       
13 <www.ecostandard.org/ 
about_who_we_are.php> 
14 IEC Guide 114: "Environmentally con-
scious design – Integrating environmental 
aspects into design and development of 
electrotechnical products" (Geneva, 2005) 
and IEC Guide 109: "Environmental aspects 
– Inclusion in electrotechnical product 
standards" (Geneva, 2003). 
into the working committee process if 
and when it appears necessary. Again 
in other cases, experts from consumer, 
employee or environmental groups are 
members of the boards of standardiza-
tion organizations where they have the 
opportunity to draw attention to the 
interests and values they represent but 
cannot feed them directly into the 
standardization work. 
But consumer groups and, to a greater 
degree, the other groups stress the 
lack of funds and other resources as a 
continuing obstacle to effective par-
ticipation in standardization (Sche-
pel/Falke 2000: 111-127). Another 
problem is the narrow focus of exper-
tise of most experts who are delegated 
by a consumer, environmental or 
employee group into a standardization 
committee. Usually not all aspects of a 
standard are covered by a single ex-
pert. More serious is the issue of 
appropriate representation of the 
groups' interests and perspectives 
because it is difficult to establish that 
the view presented by the expert who 
represents a group is in fact the collec-
tive view (Hawkins 1995). As a conse-
quence direct involvement of experts 
from consumer, employee and envi-
ronmental groups in the SDO often 
fails to meet the expectations these 
groups associate with it. 
Direct participation in the process of 
standards development and, if possi-
ble, also proportional representation 
by the participants of the plurality of 
non-industry interests and values 
would perfectly meet the requirements 
of input legitimacy. There is broad 
consensus that without public funding 
and other support, non-industry 
interests would not be represented in 
the standardization process at all. But 
one can have doubts that further 
efforts to "pro-actively support 
participation of relevant stakeholders 
in standardisation work at the 
national, European, and international 
levels" will really have the effect 
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expected by the European Commission 
and other political authorities.15 A look 
at standards development for the 
Internet confirms this view. Internet 
standardization has established itself 
completely detached from the official 
SDO as well as from the prevailing 
industry standards for networks 
(David/Werle 2000). The Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF) is more 
open and inclusive than any other 
official or informal SDO (Froomkin 
2003). Only individuals (and not firms 
or other organizations) can be "mem-
bers" of the IETF and most of the work 
is done via inexpensive electronic 
means of communication. But the 
expectation that these features attract 
many individuals with non-technical 
and non-industry interests and con-
cerns has been disappointed. "By and 
large, vendors, service providers, and 
to a lesser extent, academia dominate 
the lists and the meetings" while users, 
for instance, "are as under-represented 
on the distribution lists and at the 
meetings as they are on ITU-T and OSI 
committees" (Jakobs 2000: 157). 
Thus, achieving legitimacy through 
direct participation in standards com-
mittees is not only contingent on the 
openness of an SDO and the availabil-
ity of public funding but also on the 
prevailing rules and principles govern-
ing the process of the development of 
standards. Of special interest in this 
context is the consensus principle 
which guides decision-making at the 
working level of standardization and is 
shared by virtually all official and 
informal SDO (see above Diagram 2). 
Consensus, essential for input legiti-
macy, is difficult to accomplish. Al-
though it is not the same as unanimity 
and practices have evolved in many 
SDO to arrive at consensus this princi-
ple affords veto power to every indi-
                                                       
15 General guidelines for the cooperation 
between CEN, CENELEC AND ETSI and the 
European Commission and The European 
Free Trade Association 28 March 2003. 
Official Journal of the EU 2003/c 91/04: 7-
11, p. 10. 
vidual involved. Thus, a tension be-
tween legitimacy through consensus 
and efficiency in terms of adopting 
many standards quickly is undisputa-
ble (Rada 2000).16 The more diverse the 
interests involved in a standards 
committee are the more difficult it is to 
forge consensus. This is one reason 
why several informal SDO, consortia in 
particular, target industrial parties but 
hesitate to involve other stakeholders 
and participants as they might increase 
diversity (Werle 2001). But also in this 
respect the difference between official 
and informal SDO is one of degree 
rather than principle (Egyedi 2001). 
The obstacles to direct participation of 
non-industry interests are multiplied if 
not only stakeholders such as con-
sumers or labor but also civil liberties 
organizations and public interest 
groups are to be involved in standardi-
zation – a requirement that suggests 
itself from the point of view of the 
legitimacy of standards.17 More than 
consumer or employee groups these 
organizations strive for technical 
solutions including standards which 
secure openness of technical systems, 
help protect privacy and provide for 
"democratic" elements in the design of 
technical systems in particular in ICT. 
Adding public interests groups to the 
circle of actors actively involved in 
                                                       
16 New participants in the working groups 
of the IETF read the following instructions: 
"The general rule on disputed topics is that 
the Working Group has to come to 'rough 
consensus', meaning that a very large 
majority of those who care must agree. The 
exact method of determining rough con-
sensus varies from Working Group to 
Working Group. The lack of voting has 
caused some very long delays for some 
proposals, but most IETF participants who 
have witnessed rough consensus after 
acrimonious debates feel that the delays 
often result in better protocols." 
(<www.ietf.org/tao.html#9.1>) 
17 Stakeholders are understood here as 
persons or groups with a direct economic 
interest, involvement, or investment in 
something, for example, the employees, 
shareholders, and customers of a com-
pany. 
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standardization increases the inclu-
siveness and the democratic quality of 
the process. The heterogeneity of 
interests and values is appreciated 
from a legitimacy perspective but if 
they are directly involved in standardi-
zation the result may be inefficiency, 
delay and deadlock of the process. 
Also, affected companies may try to 
bypass the respective SDO and turn to 
more exclusive ones. 
A response of many SDO to this prob-
lem has been to put more emphasis on 
output than on input legitimacy of 
standardization. What counts at the 
end of the day is to issue standards 
which are accepted by the addressees 
or the general public as beneficial or at 
least as not harmful no matter how the 
details of the standardization process 
have been shaped. However, consider-
ing the possible positive and negative 
externalities of a standard, the "market 
test" (diffusion in the market) is not 
sufficient to establish its benefit. 
Developing a "good" standard requires 
facilitating access to SDO of as many 
diverse interests and values as neces-
sary to assure that all relevant techni-
cal, commercial, socio-economic and 
socio-political aspects are appropri-
ately taken into account. But it does 
not require that they are directly  and 
proportionally represented in the 
standardization process by advocates 
and other representatives of these 
interests and values. 
Although we claim here to observe 
tendencies of many SDO to put em-
phasis on achieving output legitimacy, 
we are not arguing that this indicates 
an encompassing general trend. It 
would also be misleading to infer that 
the SDO acknowledge a kind of func-
tional imperative if they shift emphasis 
into this direction. Rather external 
pressure originating from three 
sources has been exerted on them, 
especially on the official SDO, to more 
explicitly consider the legitimacy of 
their standards and search for an 
adequate strategy to cope with this 
requirement. 
1. In the first place policymakers and 
regulators have called for strength-
ening the legitimacy of standards. 
One step has been that many coun-
tries require formal public inquiries 
during the adoption of national 
standards by the official SDO. Also, 
in particular in the EU – resulting 
from the New Approach to Techni-
cal Harmonisation (in 1985) which 
spelled out that harmonized stan-
dards virtually always include regu-
latory components – the official 
SDO had to formally recognize the 
need to involve public interests into 
the standard setting process. As 
early as 1984, this was put forth in 
a joint memorandum between the 
political authorities and CEN and 
CENELEC. But the way of how to 
involve "public authorities, manu-
facturers, users, consumers, trade 
unions" and other groups effectively 
in the drawing up of European 
standards was left open.18 
2. More general pressures can be 
associated with the dynamic market 
for standards.19 The efficiency ar-
gument traditionally made to le-
gitimize streamlining the standardi-
zation process by circumventing 
"superfluous" interests has to a cer-
tain degree been turned around. 
Initially competitive pressures have 
made a standard in line with con-
sumer preferences more successful 
on this market than one that re-
flects the narrower commercial in-
terests of business. Recent devel-
opments in ICT suggest that stan-
dards which have been adopted in a 
                                                       
18 General Guidelines for Cooperation 
between the European Commission and 
CEN and CENELEC, agreed on 13 Novem-
ber 1984, and published as CEN/CENELEC 
Memorandum No 4. <www.cenorm.be/ 
boss/production/production+processes+-
+index/candidate+harmonized+standards
/cclcgd004.pdf> 
19 A qualified indication is that there are 
around 400 standards bodies currently in 
operation. See the Consortium and Stan-
dards List at 
<www.consortiuminfo.org/links/> 
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more pluralist environment are per-
ceived as equitable and therefore 
more appealing on this market. 
3. A third set of pressures involves the 
activities of advocacy and interest 
groups. The advent of such grass-
root civil liberties and public inter-
est groups is linked to the emer-
gence of ICT systems and their po-
tential opportunities and risks. 
They have directed attention to 
technical standards which coordi-
nate and regulate the development 
and use of the systems. These 
groups and their interests and val-
ues could no longer be ignored by 
the SDO which organizationally re-
sponded in various ways to these 
new pressures. 
 
6 Reframing standardization 
Achieving output legitimacy requires 
successfully integrating a great plural-
ity of interests and values in the stan-
dardization process without necessar-
ily requiring the direct participation of 
the respective stakeholders and advo-
cates. This means that in effect the 
cognitive and normative frame in 
which the deliberations on standards 
take place must be broadened. 
That the cognitive and normative 
frame of a collective decision-making 
process has an influence on the out-
come has been shown in many ex-
perimental and "real world" studies in 
different traditions of social theory. In 
Goffman's seminal analysis frames are 
defined as basic cognitive structures 
which guide the perception of reality. 
They are adopted in a communicative 
process (cf. Goffman 1974). Frames 
promote particular problem 
definitions, causal interpretations and 
moral evaluations and they influence 
individual and collective decisions. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1985) 
demonstrate the behavioral effects of 
different frames in experiments which 
show that economic choices are 
controlled by the formulation of a 
problem as well as by habits, norms 
and values. In the early 1990s, frame 
analysis made inroads in policy 
studies. Frames are seen as con-
stituting policy issues and at the same 
time providing guideposts for ana-
lyzing, persuading and acting on them 
(Rein/Schön 1993). Frames can change 
in discursive deliberations but in a 
stable institutional setting a new domi-
nant frame does not replace previously 
legitimate frames (cf. Surel 2000). 
For a long time, the cognitive frame of 
the standards developing process was 
a technical one. Standardization was 
perceived as a search process aiming 
at finding the technically optimal 
solution which then was easy to agree 
upon. The technical discourse among 
engineers prevailed and non-technical 
arguments tended to be considered 
illegitimate. Since the 1970s, this 
discourse has increasingly been sup-
plemented in some and marginalized 
in other SDO by a business oriented 
commercial discourse.20 Strategic 
commercial interests are argued in 
light of firm-level capabilities, com-
plementary assets, any installed con-
sumer-base, and of course the pros-
pect of new customers. Thus, competi-
tive concerns and profit interests are 
generally regarded as legitimate by the 
actors participating in standardization 
(Schmidt/Werle 1998). This shows that 
it is possible, in principle, to change 
the cognitive and normative frame of 
the standardization discourse and it 
has encouraged SDO to try to include 
other elements which direct the stan-
dards committees' attention toward 
non-technical and non-commercial 
issues. 
The SDO gathered some experience 
with environmental implications of 
standards which, if at all, are usually 
                                                       
20 An indication that the technical discourse 
has still some relevance is provided by the 
IETF's widely cited philosophy: "We reject 
kings, presidents, and voting; we believe in 
rough consensus and running code." In 
this reading standardization is about 
finding not necessarily the best but a 
technically reasonable ("running") solution. 
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revealed in a late stage of the devel-
opment of a standard – too late to 
intervene in the process. As a conse-
quence SDO such as the DIN in Ger-
many or the European Committee for 
Standardization (CEN) established an 
Environmental Helpdesk with the task 
to advice and support the standardiza-
tion committees considering environ-
mental aspects. CEN has issued "Envi-
ronmental Guidelines" to ensure the 
best possible incorporation of envi-
ronmental aspects.21 It is emphasized 
by CEN that the integration of envi-
ronmental aspects in standards is a 
voluntary instrument to achieve envi-
ronmental goals. But at the same time 
CEN requests that "every work item 
should include an assessment of the 
environmental aspects as early as 
possible in the process. It should 
preferably be done between the stage 
of approval of a work item and the 
stage of circulation of a first document 
at the latest, in order to avoid delays in 
standardization process."22 We already 
mentioned comparable developments 
at the international level but what we 
want to emphasize here is that SDO 
continuously try to feed environmental 
aspects into the cognitive and norma-
tive frame of the standardization 
process. These efforts are reinforced 
by a significantly growing public 
interest for the environment. 
Another notable attempt – initiated by 
public policy agents – aims at integrat-
ing the specific needs of "minorities" 
such as handicapped people in the 
standardization process. Traditional 
design of technology in effect excludes 
the handicapped. On the other hand 
the group of the handicapped and their 
                                                       
21 The CEN "Guide for the inclusion of 
environmental aspects in product stan-
dards" (Guide 4) was issued in 1998 and 
revised in 2004. 
22 CEN: Guidance – Consideration of 
environmental aspects in standards, 
version 1 (January 2005) 
<www.cenorm.be/boss/supporting/guidanc
e+documents/gd050+-+environmental 
+aspects+in+standards/index.asp> 
needs are very heterogeneous, because 
this category spans a wide range of 
individuals from those with impaired 
vision, to those with different types of 
other functional disabilities. For that 
reason direct participation of handi-
capped in standardization would 
always imply selective rather than 
encompassing representation. 
In several countries public agencies 
support relevant research and devel-
opment and influence companies to 
consider these needs in the design and 
standardization of technology. One 
case in point is Norway which 
launched the "Information Technology 
for the Disabled (IT Funk)" program. 
This long term attempt shall affect 
standardization at the national and the 
supranational level in order to improve 
the conditions for the disabled mainly 
in terms of accessibility to ICT systems 
and services.23 The other Scandinavian 
countries are involved in similar 
actions. The "Danish Centre for 
Assistive Technology" provides input 
into ETSI, CEN and ISO and tracks 
standardization processes from the 
angle of the needs of handicapped 
people. All Nordic countries run 
laboratories which test products but 
also propose European standards from 
this angle and provide feedback into 
standardization.24 
Official SDO, in particular, have 
reacted to the emerging initiatives and 
pressures by either issuing guidelines 
for standard-makers on how to take 
into account the needs of disabled 
people25 or setting up a special 
committee which is responsible for 
guidelines and standards that deal 
with requirements of disabled people 
(ETSI HF). 
                                                       
23 <www.itfunk.org/docs/engpres.html> 
24 <www.hmi.dk/index.asp?id=482> 
25 See Guidelines for standards developers 
to address the needs of older persons and 
persons with disabilities (ISO/IEC Guide 71, 
2001) and the European equivalent issued 
by CEN/CENELEC (Guide 6, 2001).  
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More recent developments indicate 
that awareness creation has shifted to 
the encompassing issue of how the 
interests and needs of all types of 
minority groups linked to the use of 
technology can be considered in 
standardization. Efforts in this direc-
tion emphasize the "design for all" 
principle. If this principle is taken into 
account in the standards development 
process the likelihood increases that 
the resulting standards are acceptable 
to all who are directly or indirectly 
affected by them. They may even help 
avoiding problems such as computer 
illiteracy and the "digital divide". The 
idea to influence the design of tech-
nology by promoting design for all 
principles in standardization emerged 
in the USA in the 1960s. The American 
National Standards Institute (ANSI) 
adopted "universal design" principles 
in 1961. In the following decades the 
idea slowly diffused to Europe and 
South-East Asia. A new bibliography 
on design for all principles indicates 
that more than 50 documents of 
different types produced by official 
supranational SDO address ways to 
include such principles in the delibera-
tion on standards (Olsson/Lyhne 
2005). 
ANEC and other consumer associa-
tions strongly support design for all 
priorities. These principles have a root 
in consumerism but they are also 
rooted in the US civil rights movement. 
Based on the tradition of these move-
ments new civil society and public 
interests groups have emerged which 
have become aware of the societal 
significance of technical standards. 
The Internet, in particular, has stimu-
lated a broad debate regarding the 
democratic legitimacy of standardiza-
tion in the Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF) and the World Wide Web 
Consortium (W3C) (Froomkin 2003; 
Russell 2003). More than in other 
contexts of standardization, general 
aspects of democracy rather than 
special consumer, employee or envi-
ronmental interests are emphasized in 
this debate. Among the few public 
interests and civil society groups 
which highlight the significance of 
standardization is the Center for 
Democracy and Technology (CDT). 
This advocacy group has most actively 
struggled for the consideration of 
individual civil rights and civil society 
values in Internet standardization. In 
1996, the CDT set up the Internet 
Privacy Working Group which initiated 
the development of technical privacy 
specifications in the W3C. Some mem-
bers of the working group participated 
in developing the Platform for Privacy 
Preferences (P3P) standard.26 
In an analysis of the experience gath-
ered during this activity – but also in 
several cases in the IETF – the CDT 
points to the limitations of direct 
participation of public interest advo-
cates in standardization (Davidson et 
al. 2002; Morris/Davidson 2003). Direct 
ongoing participation is regarded to be 
most effective, as in the case of P3P, 
but extremely time and resource 
intensive and, thus, not feasible as a 
standard operating procedure. But also 
the less resource-consuming ad hoc 
mode of participation is considered to 
be of limited usefulness because the 
public interest advocates retain the 
role of an outsider whose suggestions 
can easily be dismissed by the commit-
tee. An alternative to direct participa-
tion is seen in monitoring and tracking 
the work of standards committees by 
the public interest community. The 
CDT developed instructions ("ritualized 
public policy impact assessments") to 
be followed if standardization proc-
esses are monitored. This and other 
documents – characteristic of the 
efforts to broaden the cognitive and 
normative frame of standardization – 
aim at creating awareness of potential 
policy impacts of standards. They 
address different areas of public policy 
                                                       
26 This standardized technology communi-
cates the privacy policies of web sites to 
the users that connect to them (Cranor 
2002). 
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concern, ranging from "Content Cen-
sorship and Control" to "Personal 
Privacy."27 They shall be addressed by 
the standard developers when they 
design new technologies. 
Taken together, these illustrations 
indicate that broadening the cognitive 
and normative frame of standardiza-
tion is a promising option for SDO in a 
situation in which they have started to 
stress output legitimacy in response to 
the pressure to strengthen the legiti-
macy of standards. Reshaping the 
normative and cognitive frame of 
standardization is in itself a delibera-
tive process in which ideally individu-
als with diverse interests, preferences 
and values should be involved (Ham-
lett 2003: 132). But this appears unfea-
sible in standardization, especially at 
the European and international level. 
Strategies to create advisory groups 
which monitor and occasionally inter-
vene into the work of standardization 
committees and to issue guidelines 
which draw attention to issues usually 
not considered by these committees 
are at least one step toward reframing 
standardization. A broadened cognitive 
and normative frame makes it possible 
– but by no means guarantees – that 
non-industry interests and values are 
considered. They are not directly 
represented in the standardization 
committees but may be "invoked" by 
the members (cf. Feng 2005). 
 
7 Conclusion 
Adopting technical standards makes 
up a crucial step in the process of 
developing technology. It often takes 
place in company labs hidden from the 
public. A significant number of stan-
dards are developed in SDO. Company 
standards provide input into this 
process. They are voluntarily disclosed 
because the companies expect to 
                                                       
27 Concerning the work of the IETF: Public 
Policy Considerations for Internet Design 
Decisions <www.cdt.org/standards/draft-
morris-policy-considerations-00.pdf> 
benefit from the agreement on a 
common standard in the SDO. Partici-
pation in standards development is 
time-consuming, resource-intensive 
and requires technical expertise. Taken 
together it is not surprising that the 
majority of participants in standardiza-
tion are agents of firms. Given the 
plurality of interests and values in 
society these agents are definitely not 
representative. The bias towards 
industry interest representation is – 
with few exceptions – strongest at the 
international level, where even small 
and medium-sized enterprises are 
absent, not to mention non-industry 
interests and values. The SDO are 
aware that this bias calls the legiti-
macy of standards into question – 
regulative (mandatory) and coordina-
tive (voluntary) standards alike. 
The institutional rules of committee 
standardization, in particular the 
relative openness and transparency of 
the process, in principle, attract par-
ticipation by actors and groups inter-
ested in or affected by a standard. But 
without public funding and without 
pressure on the SDO consumer, em-
ployee and environmental as well as 
minority, civil society and public policy 
interests would usually not be consid-
ered in standardization. 
Two (not mutually exclusive) options 
are available to achieve legitimacy of 
standardization by including non-
industry interest and values. One 
option is to put emphasis on the input 
side of the process trying to balance 
interest and value representation 
through direct participation of all 
affected or interested groups. Apart 
from the high costs, direct participa-
tion would likely result in complexity 
overload and deadlock in the commit-
tees which are expected to decide on 
the basis of consensus. The overloaded 
SDO would be bypassed by industry 
and standardization would migrate 
from official and de-facto recognized 
informal SDO such as the World Wide 
Web Consortium into exclusive private 
consortia. 
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Partly because of these problems – but 
also partly as a consequence of an 
increasing number of interest and 
advocacy groups which claim to be 
directly or indirectly affected by the 
standards – the SDO have started to 
shift emphasis toward output legiti-
macy. The efforts to arrive at standards 
beneficial or acceptable to all affected 
vary with regard to their specific start-
ing-point. But they share the aim to 
stimulate participants in standards 
developing processes to consider 
potential non-market and non-
technical impacts of standards. They 
aim at broadening the cognitive and 
normative frame of the standardization 
discourse and creating awareness of a 
standard's implications without requir-
ing direct participation of advocates 
and representatives of non-industry 
interests and values. This is mainly 
facilitated by guidelines for standards 
committees which promote the inclu-
sion of non-market interests and 
values into the standardization dis-
course. In addition, special committees 
from outside or special boards within 
the SDO monitor and review the work 
of the standards committees and 
return an assessment to them. The 
ultimate aim of all these measures is 
creating good standards endowed with 
some form of democratic legitimacy. 
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